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ESSAYS
TAKING BAKKE SERIOUSLY:
DISTINGUISHING DIVERSITY FROM
AFFIRMATIVE ACTION IN THE LAW SCHOOL
ADMISSIONS PROCESS
ARNOLD H. LOEwY*
INTRODUCTION
Diversity and affirmative action are not the same thing. How, you
might ask, are they different and why does it matter? The answers to
these two questions form the core principle upon which this essay is
predicated.
First, how are they different? Affirmative action focuses on the
group or groups that an entity, such as a governmental unit, would
like to benefit. The rationale for its use may include such things as
prior discrimination or underrepresentation. It is generally
conceived as a stopgap measure designed to ameliorate the effects of
past discrimination.
Diversity, on the other hand, focuses on an institution. For some
kinds of positions, diversity simply is not relevant. For example, in
the Adarand' and Croson2 cases, diversity was not relevant. Each of
those cases dealt with a special set-aside for construction contracts to
minority-owned businesses. A construction company is either
minority-owned or it is not.' Diversity has nothing to do with it.
Similarly, choosing the president of a university has nothing to do
* Graham Kenan Professor of Law, The University of North Carolina School of
Law. B.S., 1961, J.D., 1963, Boston University; L.L.M., Harvard Law School, 1964.
The author is grateful for helpful suggestions from Jack Boger, Charles Daye, Eugene
Gressman, Paul Haskell, William Van Alstyne, Mark Weisburd, Larry Zelenak, and
especially Lou Bilionis and Phil Shelton. In various forms, this paper has been presented
at Drake Law School, Florida Coastal School of Law, and The University of North
Carolina School of Law, and at the Southeast Association of American Law Schools.
1. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995).
2. City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989).
3. Although, theoretically, the stock of a construction company could be partially
minority owned, that would not be the type of diversity relevant to the statutes at issue in
Adarand or Croson.
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with diversity. Only one person will be a president, and one person,
whatever his race, religion, or gender, cannot be diverse.
Diversity is a relevant concept for entities with multiple
members. Thus, for a university board of trustees, a student body, a
faculty, or a group of factory workers, diversity is a meaningful
concept. That is not to say that it is always important.4 But, it is
meaningful.
Where diversity is desirable, it is because it makes the institution
better. To the extent that a diverse institution is better than a
homogeneous one, issues of diversity will always be relevant. Thus,
unlike affirmative action, diversity is not something that should or
will become less important with time.
In the following three illustrations, I will demonstrate the
difference between an argument predicated on affirmative action and
one predicated on diversity:
ILLUSTRATIONL. The governor of a state that has never had
an African-American on its supreme court, and currently
has a supreme court vacancy, is discussing with his advisors
the desirability of placing an African-American on the
court:
AFFIRMATIVE ACTION: "There has never been an
African-American on our supreme court, and no
wonder. For years, they have been subjected to inferior
schooling, housing, and everything else. It's time that
we level the playing field. I am appointing John Jones
as our first African-American supreme court justice."
DIVERSITY: "Different perspectives are vital to a
meaningful collaborative process on our supreme court.
Although not all African-Americans have had identical
backgrounds, there are, in this country, certain
experiences that seem to be common to them and not
experienced by Caucasians. Consequently, I believe
4. Some entities are improved by diversity. One purpose of this Essay is to establish
that a law school is such an entity. For other entities, diversity may be a neutral factor.
Arguably, sports teams, which are concerned primarily with prowess in the particular sport,
are in that category. Finally, it is theoretically possible that for some entities homogeneity is
superior to diversity. Such an argument has been made in regard to assembly-line factory
workers. See Dinesh D'Souza & Christopher Edley, Jr., Affirmative Action Debate: Should
Race-Based Affirmative Action Be Abandoned as a National Policy?, 60 ALB. L. REV. 425,
449-50 (1996) (presenting D'Souza's response to a question from the audience regarding
diversity as a bona fide occupational or academic qualification). With the exception of law
schools, I take no position in regard to the accuracy of these hypotheticals.
5. See, e.g., Tracey Maclin, Race and the Fourth Amendment, 51 VAND. L. REv. 333,
333-34, 344-54 (1998) (discussing pretextual stops of black motorists by law enforcement
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that the institution of the judiciary will be better served
with an African-American on the court to share his
views with those of the five Caucasians and one Asian-
American currently sitting on the court. Thus, I am
appointing John Jones as our first African-American
supreme court justice."
ILLUSTRATION I. A school board, for budgetary reasons,
must lay off one of two teachers from a business faculty.
They are tied for the most junior department members and,
apart from race, equally qualified. One is white and the
other is black.6
AFFIRMATIVE ACTION: "African-Americans have
never been a part of this faculty from its inception until
nine years ago when both Ms. Williams (black) and Ms.
Taxman (white) were hired. This is unfair. Because of
our not hiring any African-Americans in the past, we
are going to lay off Ms. Taxman and continue to
employ Ms. Williams."
DIVERSITY: "Students in a business curriculum learn
best when taught by people who speak with different
voices and have different life experiences. Given the
presence of African-Americans in our community, it is
helpful that our students have some exposure to
teachers of that race in the course of their major.
Consequently, we believe that Ms. Williams has more
to contribute to the well being of our students than has
Ms. Taxman. Therefore, we have chosen to retain Ms.
Williams."
ILLUSTRATION I. A law school's admissions committee
has to fill a class of 200 students. The first 199 have already
been chosen. The two leading candidates for the 200th
position are Bill Smith, an African-American with a 3.1
average from Yale and a 152 LSAT score, and Ray Brown, a
Caucasian with a 3.4 average from Yale and a 157 LSAT
score.7
AFFIRMATIVE ACTION: "Minorities have always been
underrepresented at this law school. Indeed, at one
officers).
6. By no coincidence, these were the facts of Taxman v. Board of Education, 91 F.3d
1547 (3d Cir. 1996), cert. granted, 117 S. Ct. 2506, and cert. dismissed, 118 S. Ct. 595 (1997).
7. As one who has served on his own law school's admissions committee, I am, of
course, aware that Illustration II is a grossly oversimplified description of the admissions
process. That truism, however, does not affect the principle.
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time blacks were de jure excluded.' We believe that
past discrimination rather than merit differential
accounts for this underrepresentation. In this year's
class, that underrepresentation continues. Only nine of
our first 199 admittees are African-American.
Consequently, we choose to admit Bill Smith."
DIVERSITY: "Our classes are better with diverse
people in them. All other things equal, we prefer a
class with the highest numbered LSAT and GPA.
When most of the class is chosen on that basis,
however, we look to see what each additional student
can add to the mix. With only nine black students in
the class, an additional one has potentially a great deal
to add to the quality of class discussion. 9 We believe
that Bill Smith, because of his ethnicity, has more to
add to the education of his fellow students and hence is
more worthy of our final spot than is Ray Brown,
despite Mr. Brown's slightly higher numbers."
At this juncture, it is not critical that the reader accept the
wisdom of the affirmative action or diversity rationale in any of the
above situations; only that she understand them. It is especially
important that she understand the difference between the argument
from affirmative action and the argument from diversity.
In the pages that follow, I will argue that a prudent law school
should consider notions of diversity in admitting at least a portion of
its class."0 Thereafter, I will argue that such a policy is both fair and
constitutional. In regard to the constitutional argument, I accept the
notion that principles of affirmative action can be applied only when
narrowly tailored to redress a prior state wrong.'1 Consequently, I
assume that such a principle will rarely justify a race-conscious
admissions policy.'2
8. Obviously, this was not the case with all law schools.
9. See infra text accompanying notes 14-16 (reproducing the Harvard College
Admissions Program).
10. A plausible argument can be made that much of my rationale would be equally
applicable to institutions other than law schools. Undoubtedly this is so. For example, a
liberal arts college would probably fall within my analysis at least as easily as would a law
school. A medical school may or may not so easily fall within my analysis, although Justice
Powell, in Bakke, certainly thought that it did. See Regents of the Univ. v. Bakke, 438 U.S.
265,311-12 (1978) (opinion of Powell, J.). Because I know more about law schools than other
institutions, my analysis is limited thereto. To the extent that my analysis would in fact
support diversity in other situations, it should be employed. If the analysis fits, use it.
11. See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 228-29 (1995); City of
Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469,509 (1989) (plurality opinion).
12. "Rarely" is probably a more accurate term than "never." See United States v.
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I. THE PRUDENCE OF HAVING A RACIALLY DIVERSE LAW SCHOOL
STUDENT BODY
The appendix to Justice Powell's Bakke opinion,13 describing
Harvard's undergraduate admissions policy, is so in accord with my
proposal that it is worth repeating. To the extent that some nuances
of my proposal suggest a difference for law school admissions vis-a-
vis Harvard College admissions, I will describe them immediately
thereafter: 14
Harvard College Admissions Program
For the past 30 years Harvard College has received
each year applications for admission that greatly exceed the
number of places in the freshman class. The number of
applicants who are deemed to be not "qualified" is
comparatively small. The vast majority of applicants
demonstrate through test scores, high school records and
teachers' recommendations that they have the academic
ability to do adequate work at Harvard, and perhaps to do it
with distinction. Faced with the dilemma of choosing
among a large number of "qualified" candidates, the
Committee on Admissions could use the single criterion of
scholarly excellence and attempt to determine who among
the candidates were likely to perform best academically.
But for the past 30 years the Committee on Admissions has
never adopted this approach. The belief has been that if
scholarly excellence were the sole or even predominant
criterion, Harvard College would lose a great deal of its
vitality and intellectual excellence and that the quality of
the educational experience offered to all students would
suffer. 151  Consequently, after selecting those students
Fordice, 505 U.S. 717, 721-32 (1992) (tracing the history of segregation in Mississippi state
universities and of lawsuits intended to redress it); cf. Adarand, 515 U.S. at 237 ("[W]e wish
to dispel the notion that strict scrutiny is 'strict in theory, but fatal in fact .... ' When race-
based action is necessary to further a compelling interest, such action is within constitutional
constraints if it satisfies the 'narrow tailoring' test this Court has set out in previous cases."
(quoting Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 519 (1980) (Marshall, J., concurring in the
judgment))).
13. See Bakke, 438 U.S. at 321-24 (appendix to opinion of Powell, J.).
14. If the reader is already familiar with the Harvard College admissions program,
please go on to the text following it.
15. Professor Graglia reads this sentence as if Harvard thought scholarly and
intellectual excellence were "not only different but incompatible." Lino A. Graglia,
Professor Loewy's "Diversity" Defense of Racial Preference: Defining Discrimination
Away, 77 N.C. L. REV. 1505, 1516 (1999). Of course, the statement says no such thing. It
says that intellectual excellence consists of several elements, including, but not limited to,
scholarly excellence.
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whose intellectual potential will seem extraordinary to the
faculty-perhaps 150 or so out of an entering class of over
1,100-the Committee seeks-
variety in making its choices. This has seemed
important ... in part because it adds a critical
ingredient to the effectiveness of the educational
experience [in Harvard College].... The effectiveness
of our students' educational experience has seemed to
the Committee to be affected as importantly by a wide
variety of interests, talents, backgrounds and career goals
as it is by a fine faculty and our libraries, laboratories
and housing arrangements. Dean of Admissions Fred
L. Glimp, Final Report to the Faculty of Arts and
Sciences, 65 Official Register of Harvard University
No. 25, 93, 105-105 (1968) (emphasis supplied).
The belief that diversity adds an essential ingredient to
the educational process has long been a tenet of Harvard
College admissions. Fifteen or twenty years ago, however,
diversity meant students from California, New York, and
Massachusetts; city dwellers and farm boys; violinists,
painters and football players; biologists, historians and
classicists; potential stockbrokers, academics and politicians.
The result was that very few ethnic or racial minorities
attended Harvard College. In recent years Harvard College
has expanded the concept of diversity to include students
from disadvantaged economic, racial and ethnic groups.
Harvard College now recruits not only Californians or
Louisianans but also blacks and Chicanos and other
minority students. Contemporary conditions in the United
States mean that if Harvard College is to continue to offer a
first-rate education to its students, minority representation
in the undergraduate body cannot be ignored by the
Committee on Admissions.
In practice, this new definition of diversity has meant
that race has been a factor in some admission decisions.
When the Committee on Admissions reviews the large
middle group of applicants who are "admissible" and
deemed capable of doing good work in their courses, the
race of an applicant may tip the balance in his favor just as
geographic origin or a life spent on a farm may tip the
balance in other candidates' cases. A farm boy from Idaho
can bring something to Harvard College that a Bostonian
cannot offer. Similarly, a black student can usually bring
something that a white person cannot offer. The quality of
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the educational experience of all the students in Harvard
College depends in part on these differences in the
background and outlook that students bring with them.
In Harvard College admissions the Committee has not
set target-quotas for the number of blacks, or of musicians,
football players, physicists or Californians to be admitted in
a given year. At the same time the Committee is aware that
if Harvard College is to provide a truly heterogen[e]ous
environment that reflects the rich diversity of the United
States, it cannot be provided without some attention to
numbers. It would not make sense, for example, to have 10
or 20 students out of 1,100 whose homes are west of the
Mississippi. Comparably, 10 or 20 black students would not
begin to bring to their classmates and to each other the
variety of points of view, backgrounds and experiences of
blacks in the United States. Their small numbers might also
create a sense of isolation among the black students
themselves and thus make it more difficult for them to
develop and achieve their potential. Consequently, when
making its decisions, the Committee on Admissions is aware
that there is some relationship between numbers and
achieving the benefits to be derived from a diverse student
body, and between numbers and providing a reasonable
environment for those students admitted. But that
awareness does not mean that the Committee sets a
minimum number of blacks or of people from west of the
Mississippi who are to be admitted. It means only that in
choosing among thousands of applicants who are not only
"admissible" academically but have other strong qualities,
the Committee, with a number of criteria in mind, pays
some attention to distribution among many types and
categories of students.
The further refinements sometimes required help to
illustrate the kind of significance attached to race. The
Admissions Committee, with only a few places left to fill,
might find itself forced to choose between A, the child of a
successful black physician in an academic community with
promise of superior academic performance, and B, a black
who grew up in an inner-city ghetto of semi-literate parents
whose academic achievement was lower but who had
demonstrated energy and leadership as well as an
apparently abiding interest in black power. If a good
number of black students much like A but few like B had
already been admitted, the Committee might prefer B; and
vice versa. If C, a white student with extraordinary artistic
1999] 1485
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talent, were also seeking one of the remaining places, his
unique quality might give him an edge over both A and B.
Thus, the critical criteria are often individual qualities or
experience not dependent upon race but sometimes
associated with it.16
One could, and to some extent I do, quarrel with the percentage
of students chosen for diversity vis-A-vis intellectual brilliance. At
least in the absence of academic qualifications similar to that of
Harvard applicants, I would be more inclined to pick something like
three-fourths of an entering law school class primarily on the basis of
intellectual acumen17 and the remainder primarily to achieve
diversity.
Many people who support the concept of diversity oppose racial
diversity because in their view race is an insufficient proxy for
whatever characteristics constitute diversity. In my judgment, this
perspective is clouded by the tendency of educational institutions to
overuse race, that is, to make it the only relevant criterion for
determining diversity. It is not true that race is the only, or even the
most significant, feature marking diversity. On the other hand,
neither is it the least significant. A black growing up in the inner city
may have a different set of experiences than a similarly-situated
white. And it is not clear which one would add greater diversity. It is
possible that a white raised under those circumstances would actually
add more diversity to a class than a similarly-raised black." But the
fact that we don't have an a priori answer to that question does not
mean that we shouldn't ask it.
There is an unfortunate dichotomy in the academy (and
elsewhere) between those who believe that diversity involving race
does not count as diversity and those who believe that racial diversity
is the only diversity that counts. If this Essay has one central
message, it is that both of these perspectives are wrong. Racial
16. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 321-24 (appendix to opinion of Powell, J.) (quoting Harvard
College Admissions Program) (citation omitted). The Admissions Program appears in the
brief that was submitted by Columbia University, Harvard University, Stanford University,
and the University of Pennsylvania as amici curiae. See id. at 321 n.55 (appendix to opinion
of Powell, J.).
17. Ordinarily, but not always, this quality is measured by numbers. A person with
lower numbers might replace a person with higher numbers by, for example, having attended
a much more difficult undergraduate school, or an undergraduate school that grades on a
much lower grading scale. In such a case, the person with lower numbers might be expected
to perform better on exams, contribute more to the analytical quality of classroom discussion,
and ultimately become a better lawyer. The last of these points is, of course, speculative. See
infra notes 32-34 and accompanying text.
18. For a discussion of this issue, see infra notes 67-70 and accompanying text.
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diversity can and should count, but it is not the only, or necessarily
the primary, thing that should count.19
Few people doubt the utility of race-neutral diversity.20 I count
among my former students a retired surgeon, the former deputy
mayor of a major city, and a retired Indian General. All of these
students added perspectives that could not be obtained from whoever
happened to be next on the list of academic numbers.2' Similarly, a
former policeman in criminal procedure, a former business executive
in corporations, and a former bank examiner in commercial law are
sure to enrich those classes in ways that mere numbers cannot. 2
On the other hand, the concept of a law school obtaining a better
student body by choosing students that it believes will do less well
academically is counter-intuitive. In my early academic years (more
than twenty-five years ago), admissions committees considered things
other than numbers, but primarily to obtain academic stars whose
potential was not fairly measured by the numbers. Thus, a football
player might have gotten special consideration, not because he would
19. Consequently, this Essay should offer no comfort to those law schools for which race
is the only diversity that counts. For that reason, it is an inappropriate target for those like
Professor Graglia, who object to racial diversity's being the only diversity that counts. See
Graglia, supra note 15, at 1519-20.
20. Arguably, the textual statement overstates slightly. An argument against diversity
in legal education does exist. The more different students are, the longer it might take to
cover a substantive point. For example, I know of one instance where the following
dialogue occurred in a classroom:
Prof: If someone points an unloaded gun at you that you know is unloaded, is
there an assault?
Student: Yes.
Prof. The correct answer is "no." If you know that the gun is unloaded then you
don't fear harm. Consequently no assault.
Student: I'm from the inner city. In my neighborhood when somebody points an
unloaded gun at you, you know that he intends to bash you over the head with it.
Obviously, if the whole class consisted of white middle-class students, the principle could
have been taught more efficiently. On the other hand, the depth of the learning experience is
surely enhanced by the inner-city student's observation, and both the professor and the other
students have obtained a perspective that they otherwise would not have obtained. If you
believe that breadth of coverage rather than depth of understanding is what law school is
about, I will probably not persuade you that diversity is a good idea. On the other hand, if
depth of understanding more closely captures the function of legal education, the above
dialogue is an argument for, not against, diversity.
21. I do not know what the entering credentials of any of these students were. It is
possible that some or all of them would have been admitted at the top of any class chosen
exclusively by the numbers. My point is that, apart from their brilliance, each contributed a
perspective that would have been lost if he or she were not there. And that would be no less
true if their numbers were less than others who were not admitted and who had no unusual
perspective to share with their classmates.
22. Of course, there are those who, like Professor Graglia as a student at Columbia,
fail to discern the benefit of even this type of diversity. See Graglia, supra note 15, at 1516.
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add diversity, but because his football playing may have artificially
depressed his numbers (particularly his GPA). When we started
valuing racial and ethnic diversity, I thought that it was the socially
correct thing to do, but that it would reduce the quality of the class.
In fact, consideration of diversity has enhanced, rather than reduced,
the quality of the class.
To some extent, one might quibble over what constitutes an
enhanced class. I do not necessarily believe that diverse classes,
ethnically or otherwise, perform better on exams. But I do believe
that they learn more. Proving this point to the unpersuaded, I
concede, is difficult. I do know that I have taught some (fortunately
not too many) constitutional law classes with no African-American
students therein. I can tell the reader that something was missing
therefrom. Perhaps this problem is less true in corporations or
commercial law,' but it is certainly true in the other courses that I
teach (criminal law, criminal procedure, and First Amendment).
Perhaps the proof will come from California, where because of a
state constitutional amendment, 24 and Texas, where because of a
federal court decision,25 race cannot be relevant to the admissions
process. The universities in those states, including their law schools,
have become involuntary little "laboratories, '' 26 by teaching classes in
which racial diversity cannot be relevant in the admissions process.
My own experience suggests to me that these law schools will
admit students with higher numbers and educate them less well.
Indeed, I am more confident of the latter than the former. I am less
sure that the numbers will actually rise because I fear that the
absence of diversity may diminish the prestige of the affected schools,
causing the brightest of the applicants (of all races) to choose to be
23. I underscore the word "perhaps." I strongly suspect that even in those courses, racial
diversity makes a positive difference to the quality of everybody's learning.
24. See CAL. CONST. art. I, § 31(a), upheld in Coalition for Econ. Equity v. Wilson, 122
F.3d 692,702-03 (9th Cir. 1997).
25. See Hopwood v. Texas, 78 F.3d 932, 934-35 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 518 U.S. 1033
(1996).
26. The phrase of course was coined by Justice Brandeis in New State Ice Co. v.
Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262 (1932). See id. at 311 (Brandeis, J., dissenting) ("It is one of the
happy incidents of the federal system that a single courageous State may, if its citizens
choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and economic experiments without risk to
the rest of the country."). Justice Brandeis supported voluntary (not involuntary) state
experimentation with different types of economic statutes so that the rest of the country
could learn from the experimenting state's experience. California's experimentation is, of
course, voluntary from the perspective of the State, though not from the perspective of the
universities. Texas's experimentation was forced on both the State and the universities by the
ill-conceived Hopwood decision. See infra note 49. Presumably, we will all learn a great deal
from the experimentation forced on the universities in California and Texas.
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educated in an institution that more highly values diversity.27
I would underscore, however, that just as racial diversity matters,
it is not the only diversity that matters. In a class of 200, I would tend
to choose the first Iranian or the first Sikh over the twenty-third
African-American. On the other hand, largely for the reasons
suggested in the Harvard admissions policy,' a substantial minority
group in the community will help the learning of all by being
substantially represented. Whites can and should learn that black
thinking is not monolithic. Students of all races should be exposed to
future Clarence Thomases as well as future Thurgood Marshalls.
In thinking about how to choose a law school's student body, it
might be helpful to think about how one would choose his own small
seminar. I teach a ten-student seminar in constitutional
adjudication,29 and most assuredly cannot choose my students. If I
could, however, I would begin by trying to find the smartest student
available. Probably, I would do the same thing for the next couple of
students. After that, I think that diversity makes a bigger difference
in class than intellectual acuity. For example, a seminar consisting of
the school's three top students, an Asian, a European, an African-
American, a liberal, a conservative, an atheist, and a policewoman is
likely to lead to better discussion (and hence better learning) than a
class consisting of the top ten students based on entering numbers, all
of whom may be white American moderates.
Of course, none of this suggests that students who are unlikely to
help the law school should be admitted. Quite the contrary, the
raison d'etre of the proposed admissions policy is to enhance the
quality of the law school. The theory is that in choosing among
qualified applicants, the law school ought to admit those who will
help the school the most with its educational mission.30
To be sure, a law school implementing my suggestion is likely to
27. Of course, this fear is predicated on the assumption that the limitations in Texas and
California remain indigenous to those states. If the rule adopted in those states were adopted
nationwide (public and private), the relative prestige of the nation's universities would
presumably remain the same. Then, if my analysis has been correct, only the quality of
education would suffer.
28. See supra text accompanying notes 14-16 (quoting Harvard College Admissions
Program).
29. Each week two students argue a case that could be before the Supreme Court that
term. The other eight students and I serve as the Court. We resolve the case collaboratively,
and I assign an opinion to somebody in the majority.
30. Of course, enhancing the quality of the law school is not just for the sake of the law
school as an institution. It is primarily for the education of the other students who have
already been admitted.
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have lower numbers than one that admits exclusively on the numbers.
Consequently, it risks dropping in such polls as the U.S. News and
World Report rankings. While not irrelevant, I do not believe that
such considerations ought to be determinative. I am employed by a
state law school in a state whose motto is: "To be rather than to
seem."31 Even at law schools that do not formally invoke that motto,
its substance is salutary. Thus, if the proposals contained herein
really do make a law school better, they should be adopted if, in
addition thereto, they are fair and constitutional. I now turn to an
analysis of these issues.
II. Is IT FAIR?
In assessing fairness, refer back to Illustration III at the
beginning of this essay for a paradigm. You will recall that a law
school seeking to fill its 200th and last spot in the entering class has to
choose between Bill Smith, an African-American with a GPA of 3.1
from Yale and a 152 LSAT, and Ray Brown, a Caucasian with a 3.4
average from Yale and a 157 LSAT. Assuming that the school
chooses Bill, who would be its tenth black in a class of 200, has Ray
been treated unfairly?
Ray's claim is that although he is a better candidate than Bill, he
has been rejected because of his race. But in what sense is he a better
candidate? His numbers indicate that he will probably perform
better in his first year of law school.3" But how sure are we that he
will perform better? According to Law School Admission Council
figures, if two students with Bill's and Ray's numbers each entered
the same law school at the same time, there is approximately a 60%
probability that Ray will have a higher average in his first year.33
31. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 144-2 (1983) ("The words 'esse quam videri' are hereby
adopted as the motto of this State .... ).
32. The LSAT only purports to be a predictor for first-year law school performance. See
Philip D. Shelton, The LSAT. Good-But Not That Good, LAW SERVICES REP.,
September/October 1997, at 2,2 ("While the LSAT is a test of a person's acquired skills on a
particular day under circumstances as comparable as possible to those of everyone else taking
the test, its primary use is to predict or forecast academic performance in the first year of law
school."). Even when GPA is added, there is no claim that the composite number is designed
to predict any thing other than first-year performance. See id.
33. The 60% probability is predicated on a report from Philip Shelton, President and
Executive Director of Law School Admissions Council. See id. President Shelton's analysis
shows that a 10-point LSAT differential indicates that there is approximately a 60%
likelihood that the higher-scoring student will perform better in the first year of law school
than the lower-scoring student (assuming that their GPAs are equal and that the school's
correlation coefficient is .5, which is about average). See id. In my hypothetical, the LSAT
differential is only five points, but there is also a GPA differential. In a telephone
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While not irrelevant, that is a somewhat slender reed upon which to
predicate the accolade of better candidate. Nevertheless, if there
were no other relevant data, Ray would legitimately be deemed the
better candidate.34
But there is other relevant data. If what I have said thus far is
correct, Bill probably will add to the quality of everybody's education
in a way that Ray will not. Of course, you might say: "We don't
know that." True enough. But we also don't know that Ray will
have a higher average or make a better lawyer; we just know that it is
more likely than not.35  Similarly, it is more likely than not that Bill
will enhance the education of his classmates and hence the quality of
the learning process in a way that Ray will not. Although other
factors might swing the balance in Ray's favor36 (just as other
information might make us believe that Bill would do better than
Ray academically),3 7 in the absence of such other factors, we are
justified in thinking that Bill probably will do more than Ray to
enhance the education of his fellow students.
One issue in assessing merit is whether it should be assessed in
the abstract or in relation to institutional needs. If abstract merit is
the primary criterion, Ray probably wins. If institutional needs are
the primary criterion, Bill probably wins. 8 Merit, I suggest, is
conversation with President Shelton, my belief that the approximate 60% figure is accurate
was confirmed. Telephone Interview with President Philip Shelton (approximately June 15,
1998). On the other hand, nothing turns on precision. If someone could massage the figures
and establish that Ray actually had a 68% or 72% chance of a higher GPA in his first year of
law school, none of the positions taken in this Essay would be altered.
34. I suppose that as between two students, the one ranked higher after his first year
generally continues to rank higher. I suppose also, although this assumption is considerably
less clear, that ordinarily the higher-ranking student becomes a better lawyer. However, the
amount of discounting necessary to reach this latter conclusion renders the reed even more
slender. For this reason, Professor Graglia's assertion of great gaps in qualifications is wide
of the mark. See Graglia, supra note 15, at 1513. I suppose that he would consider a 10-point
LSAT gap to be a large disparity. Yet the data show that the higher-scoring student has only
a 60% chance of outperforming the lower-scoring student. See Shelton, supra note 32, at 2;
supra note 33.
35. At least it is more likely that he will have a higher average. I'm not sure that we
know that it is more likely than not that he will make a better lawyer.
36. Ray may have an extraordinary background working with inner-city children and
may have far more insight into that culture than Bill, who was raised in suburbia, went to all
private schools, and never suffered any form of racial discrimination.
37. Bill may have spent 60 hours a week on athletics and never took course work or the
LSAT seriously. He claims, and the law school believes, that he plans to take law school very
seriously.
38. The reason for the use of the term "probably" is that it is possible that there will be
additional circumstances such as those suggested in the preceding two footnotes. But, if you
know nothing about Bill and Ray except their respective GPAs, LSATs, and races, the
probabilistic predictions in the text are sound.
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ordinarily determined by institutional needs. For example, consider
the following three illustrations:
ILLUSTRATION L The general manager of an NFL football
team that won last year's Super Bowl has, because of a
trade, this year's top draft choice. The team is superbly
fortified at all positions except place kicker, where it
desperately needs help. The general manager is firmly
convinced that no other team is willing to trade with it.
Consequently, whom it takes in the draft will determine its
roster. The general manager checks the scouting report and
determines that the best available place kicker is only the
182nd best overall player. Yet the general manger chooses
the place kicker because that player will help the team more
than the 181 better players who were passed over.
ILLUSTRATION IL A law school is hiring one professor. It
has a serious need to find a commercial law teacher in order
to fill a glaring gap in its curriculum. Two professors apply
for the position. One is a superb constitutional law
professor, who has no experience teaching commercial law.
The other is an average, but professionally competent,
commercial law teacher. The faculty hires the commercial
law teacher, rejecting the application of the superior
constitutional law teacher.
ILLUSTRATION III. A law school is planning to admit 200
students. It has admitted the first 180 students exclusively
by GPA and LSAT. Of those 180 students, 170 are women.
The next 20 potential students are also women. Student
candidates 201-300 contain 50 women and 50 men. The law
school decides not to fill its class with candidates 181-200.
Instead it considers maleness as a relevant positive factor
and winds up filling the last 20 spots with 15 men and 5
women, ending up with a class of 175 women and 25 men.
Few would seriously question Illustrations I and II. The
argument would be that what are sought in those instances are the
best place kicker and commercial law teacher, respectively.
Consequently, the 181 better football players and the one better
constitutional law professor are not discriminated against-they
simply do not meet the job description. In the third illustration,
however, the law school is looking for the best students.
Consequently, it could be argued that the women between 181 and
200 who were not admitted were discriminated against because of
their gender (which is nearly as serious a constitutional sin as racial
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discrimination).3 9
I believe that this view of these situations is shortsighted. In
Illustration I, the team is looking for the player it needs the most.
Indeed, some teams in that situation might choose the best athlete
(perhaps a quarterback) and eschew the kicker in the hopes that
somehow they will develop somebody for this less important (but still
important) position. The fact that in Illustration I, the team chose
the place kicker is not because only place kickers need apply.
Rather, it is because being a place kicker was enough of a plus for the
team's needs that it outweighed the kicker's relatively limited overall
football skills. Similarly, the law school could have chosen the superb
constitutional law professor and could have finessed commercial law
with adjuncts until another position opened. Indeed, if the law school
is typical, there were probably some faculty who would have opted
for that solution. Nevertheless, the majority thought that the overall
institutional needs were better served by the average commercial law
professor.
The third illustration is right in line with the first two. The law
school is looking for the best students it can get to complete its class.
Just as being a place kicker or a commercial law professor were big
plusses in the first two illustrations, being a man is a big plus in this
illustration. In none of the cases is the plus absolutely determinative,
but in all of them it is a major factor in assessing the merit that the
respective institutions are seeking. But, you might say, there is
nothing suspect about favoring place kickers or commercial law
professors. There is, however, something suspect about a gender
classification, especially a male-favoring gender classification.4 °
The answer is that the admissions process is not male-favoring,
but institution-favoring. Although it is true that in this unusual class,
maleness is a positive factor, that is not universally nor even usually
true. The reason that maleness is a positive factor in this case is that
it enhances the educational value for the remainder of the class.41
39. See United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 532-33 (1996) ("To summarize the
Court's current directions for cases of official classification based on gender: Focusing on the
differential treatment or denial of opportunity for which relief is sought, the reviewing court
must determine whether the proffered justification is 'exceedingly persuasive." (emphasis
added)).
40. See Arnold H. Loewy, A Different and More Viable Theory of Equal Protection, 57
N.C. L REV. 1, 11-13 (1978); Jed Rubenfeld, Affinnative Action, 107 YALE LJ. 427, 442
(1997). Discrimination against women ought to be more suspect than discrimination against
men. But see J.E.B. v. Alabama, 511 U.S. 127, 146 (1994) (holding discrimination against
men to be as constitutionally offensive as discrimination against women).
41. Perhaps this hypothetical, better than any other, illustrates the difference between
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Consequently, one could argue that the primary beneficiaries of this
admissions decision are the already chosen 180 students, 170 of whom
are women.
42
If the institutions correctly assessed merit in accord with their
own needs in the three illustrations (as I believe they have), it is hard
to see how the choice of Bill Smith over Ray Brown is any different.
If Bill can do more for the institution than Ray, he should be
admitted. Indeed, if the rule were that generally one who can do
more for the institution would be admitted-but Bill, even though he
can do more, is not admitted because race can never be a criterion-
the irony would be that it is only because of race that Bill could not
be admitted. To illustrate, if Bill with his numbers were thought to
add to diversity because he had traveled around the world whereas
Ray had not, we would have no problem with the choice. But, when
Bill is admitted because his blackness adds the necessary diversity,
we would say that can't count.43
diversity and affirmative action. It is obvious that no case can be made for affirmative action
for men. To the extent that either gender is entitled to affirmative action, it would, of course,
be women. Nevertheless, to achieve the very different value of diversity, maleness, in this
hypothetical, helps admit the last of the applicants.
42. One of the benefits of integrated education (sexually or racially) is that it gives the
less empowered group (women, African-Americans) the opportunity to study with
members of the group (white males) that currently controls the power structure. As the
Court noted in Washington v. Seattle School District No. 1, 458 U.S. 457 (1982):
Education has come to be "a principal instrument in awakening the child to
cultural values, in preparing him for later professional training, and in helping
him to adjust normally to his environment." When that environment is largely
shaped by members of different racial and cultural groups, minority children can
achieve their full measure of success only if they learn to function in-and are
fully accepted by-the larger community. Attending an ethnically diverse school
may help accomplish this goal by preparing minority children "for citizenship in
our pluralistic society ......
Id. at 472-73 (quoting Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954); Estes v.
Metropolitan Branches of Dallas NAACP, 444 U.S. 437, 451 (1980) (Powell, J., dissenting));
cf. Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629, 634-35 (1950) (adopting a similar rationale for integrating
law schools). Of course, this is not to say that there are not those who contend that sex-
segregated education is just fine for women. See Brief of Twenty-Six Women's Colleges as
Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioner at 2, United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515 (1996)
(Nos. 94-1941, 94-2107) ("Single gender education for women greatly increases the chances
that a woman will succeed academically, pursue a career in a field traditionally associated
with men, or assume a leadership role in society."). Obviously, I believe that the argument
for integration is more powerful. Cf supra note 20 (discussing the benefits of racial
diversity). In view of the result in Virginia, apparently so does the Supreme Court. See
Virginia, 518 U.S. at 519 (holding that Virginia could not constitutionally prevent women
from enrolling at Virginia Military Institute).
43. A student with a 3.1 average and a 152 LSAT score may be better-qualified than a
student with a 3.4 average and a 157 LSAT score, either because the lesser-numbered
student has traveled around the world or because he is black. If Professor Graglia's
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Because I do not think that it is unfair to count race for the
purpose of creating an institution that better educates its students, I
have no problem with the fairness of choosing Bill over Ray.
III. IS IT CONSTITUTIONAL? 44
The argument against constitutionality goes something like this:
A racial classification was employed. Racial classifications are
justified only when there is a compelling governmental interest.
Diversity is not a compelling governmental interest. Therefore, the
admission of Bill over Ray denies Ray the equal protection of the
law. For support, Ray might invoke the following analogies: (1) If
Ray's construction company had submitted a bid of $1,000,000 to
build a road and Bill's company had submitted a bid of $1,100,000 to
build the road, and the Government had hired Bill's company
because of Bill's race, Ray would have been denied equal protection
of the law;45 (2) similarly, if Ray were a public school teacher hired
six years ago and Bill were a public school teacher hired three years
ago, and, when layoffs were necessitated, the school board chose to
ignore its seniority policy and lay off Ray rather than Bill because of
Bill's race, Ray would be denied equal protection.46
As the reader undoubtedly suspects by now, I do not believe that
these illustrations support Ray's contention. Although the question
is not free from doubt, I assume that diversity does not constitute a
"compelling" governmental interest.47 Rather, I believe that the
constitutional jurisprudence is correct, the law school may not be permitted to admit the
better-qualified student if he is better-qualified because of race, but that does not mean
that, from an institutional perspective, he is not better-qualified. At bottom, Professor
Graglia may prefer to let the LSAT score, rather than an admissions committee, "play
God." Graglia, supra note 15, at 1520. If so, I recommend that he stay off of his school's
admissions committee.
44. The constitutional issue is primarily a problem for state schools. To the extent that
private schools are subject to anti-discrimination laws somewhat similar in scope to the Equal
Protection Clause, or subject to the Equal Protection Clause because of having received
sufficient state aid to be deemed a state actor, the following analysis should also be applicable
to them.
45. See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 235-36 (1995); City of
Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 507-08 (1989).
46. See Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267,277-78 (1986) (plurality opinion).
47. In Bakke, only Justice Powell found diversity to be a compelling interest. See
Regents of the Univ. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 320 (1978) (opinion of Powell, J.). In Metro
Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547 (1990), overruled by Adarand Constructors, Inc. v.
Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995), the Court found diversity in broadcasting to be sufficient to justify
a racial classification, without finding it to be compelling. See id. at 569. The dissent in Metro
Broadcasting, which probably represents the current state of the law, see Adarand, 515 U.S. at
227, found that diversity of ownership in broadcasting was not compelling. See Metro
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question at issue differs from the above situations in that there is no
racially-inspired deviation from a race-neutral paradigm. In the
construction case, the paradigm is low bid. When a higher bid is
awarded the contract because it was submitted by a racial minority,
there is a race-conscious deviation from a race-neutral standard.
Similarly, when a senior teacher is dismissed over a junior one
because of his race, the race-neutral seniority paradigm is discarded
in favor of a race-based preference.'
If a law school's admissions policy were based strictly on the
numbers, but a special set-aside was carved out for the highest
scoring African-Americans, the analogy to the above hypotheticals
would be complete.4 9 But that is not the paradigm. Rather, the spot
for which Ray and Bill are competing is not chosen by the numbers,
but by one's potential contribution to the betterment of the
institution. That is not to say that the process is necessarily
constitutional, but only to say that it cannot be resolved by a citation
of cases predicated on a racial deviation from a race-neutral
standard.
Ray might argue that skewing a standard for racial purposes is
itself unconstitutional. If, for example, a particular faculty member
Broadcasting, 497 U.S. at 612 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). On the other hand, racial diversity
in legal education is surely more compelling than racial diversity on the airwaves, where the
race of the station's owners might not even be known to the audience or relevant to the
station's programming. See Akhil Reed Amar & Neal Kumar Katyal, Bakke's Fate, 43
UCLA L. REV. 1745,1761 & n.86 (1996).
Indeed, if compelling interest means no more to Justice O'Connor than it meant in
Employment Division v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990), it is hard to see how she would not
find racial diversity in education to be compelling. See id. at 904-06 (O'Connor, J.,
concurring in the judgment) (stating that a state's interest in controlling drugs is
sufficiently compelling to justify the lack of an exemption to its criminal law for Native
Americans for the highly controlled, religiously motivated ingestion of peyote).
Nevertheless, this Essay proceeds on the assumption that diversity in legal education
is not a compelling interest. I have chosen that route, not because I believe that the
interest is not compelling, but because I do not believe that diversity involves the type of
racial discrimination necessary to trigger strict scrutiny.
48. I believe that these are the paradigms to which Justice O'Connor refers in Adarand
when she speaks of race-based preferences as always triggering strict scrutiny. See Adarand,
515 U.S. at 227.
49. Alan Bakke was admitted to Davis Medical School because Davis had a specific
number of seats set aside for minorities. See Bakke, 438 U.S. at 270-71 (opinion of Powell,
J.). Cheryl Hopwood should have been admitted to the University of Texas Law School for
the same reason. See Hopwood v. Texas, 78 F.3d 932, 962-68 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 518 U.S.
1033 (1996) (Wiener, J., specially concurring). Unfortunately, the Fifth Circuit, with little
understanding of a process different from the one at bar (and similar to that suggested in this
Essay) chose, quite wrongly, to declare Bakke overruled and to declare Hopwood entitled to
admission because, in the Fifth Circuit's view, race can't count. Fortunately, despite its
delusion of grandeur, the Fifth Circuit is still an inferior federal court.
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believed that homogeneity, rather than diversity, makes for better
learning,50 it seems clear that skewing admission to maximize
segregation would be forbidden.51 For this reason, I reject Justice
Powell's reliance on First Amendment academic freedom principles -
as a piece of his Bakke reasoning.52 Rather, the issue seems to be
whether skewing to maximize integration is subject to the same
strictness as skewing to maximize segregation. For the reasons that
follow, it is not.
One reason for protecting diversity is the very nature of the kind
of nation we are. The concept of our national motto, e pluribus
unum, "from the many, one," suggests both the irrelevance and the
relevance of our differences. Certainly, the color of a person's skin
cannot be a measure of her rights.53 On the other hand, the pluribus
part of the equation is not irrelevant either.54 This nation celebrates
diversity in ways that few others do. And, we learn from each other.
The Clinton cabinet illustrates this point. So far as we know, no
racial, ethnic, or gender litmus test was applied to -any cabinet post.
That is, so far as we know, no white male was told: "Sorry, but
people like you need not apply." But seeking something of a balance
50. See supra note 20.
51. Cf. United States v. Fordice, 505 U.S. 717 (1992) (forbidding apparently neutral tests
that had the effect of maximizing segregation); infra text accompanying notes 61-64.
52. See Bakke, 438 U.S. at 312 (opinion of Powell, J.) ("Academic freedom, though not a
specifically enumerated constitutional right, long has been viewed as a special concern of the
First Amendment. The freedom of a university to make its own judgments as to education
includes the selection of its student body."). If the First Amendment has one absolute core
principle, it is viewpoint neutrality. See, e.g., Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 408-09, 414
(1989). Consequently, if the First Amendment were to be our guide, a faculty decision to
maximize homogeneity or segregation would have to be treated with the same respect as one
supporting diversity or integration. Because admission to law schools is conduct (and state
conduct at that, at least in regard to state law schools), the First Amendment should have no
role to play in the analysis.
53. See City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 511 (1989) (plurality
opinion); Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 273-74 (1986) (plurality opinion);
William Van Alstyne, Rites of Passage: Race, the Supreme Court and the Constitution, 46 U.
CHI. L. Rnv. 775, 809 (1979) ("[O]ne gets beyond racism by getting beyond it now. by a
complete, resolute, and credible commitment never to tolerate in one's own life-or in the
life or practices of one's government-the differential treatment of other human beings by
race.").
54. In commenting on my paper at Florida Coastal School of Law in Jacksonville,
Florida, on February 5, 1999, Professor Ufot Inamete of Florida A & M University
observed that countries that celebrate pluralism (e.g., Switzerland) survive better than
countries that do not (e.g., Bosnia).
55. See Amar & Katyal, supra note 47, at 1779 ("There is a proud American tradition
of treating education differently from other spheres: Education is
different--special--because it teaches Americans how to become full citizens in a
heterogeneous, pluralistic scheme of democratic self-government.").
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of race, ethnicity, and gender in the overall cabinet was and is
reasonable.56
We need not rely on speculation, however; the cases are replete
with endorsement of racial classification for purposes of integration.
For example, in Washington v. Seattle School District No. 1,11 the
Court held that a school district could bus students for the purpose of
achieving integration, notwithstanding the lack of a constitutional
duty to do so.58 The Court's theory was that because integration was
a positive value, the race-based busing necessary to achieve it was
constitutionally permissible. 9
But, you might say, that case did not involve discrimination.
Everybody was educated, presumably in equal schools. Even so, the
white (or, for that matter, black) child who has to spend hours on a
bus to attend a school that she would rather not attend has been hurt
because of race (if one assumes that but for her color she would not
have been bused). Conversely, in our law school hypothetical, Ray
presumably can be educated elsewhere, just not at the school that
would have educated him if he were black.6° In both cases (the bused
white student and the disappointed white law school applicant), the
white who would have had what he wanted had he been black is
disadvantaged for being white. But it is not an inherent or systemic
disadvantage. Rather, it is an incidental disadvantage designed to
take the pluribus in e pluribus unum seriously.
56. See D'Souza & Edley, supra note 4, at 436 (presenting the remarks of Professor
Edley). Of course, diversity is not relevant to each position. There can only be one Attorney
General, Secretary of Agriculture, or Secretary of Commerce. But all of the cabinet officers
working together form what is essentially a board of advisors. As such, the concept of
diversity is quite relevant.
57. 458 U.S. 457 (1982).
58. See id. at 471-74. The question of whether Seattle had ever practiced de jure
segregation was explicitly separated (segregated if you will) from the case by the district
court. See id. at 464 n.8. The case at bar was predicated on the assumption that Seattle had
not practiced de jure segregation. The Court explicitly held that "in the absence of a
constitutional violation, the desirability and efficacy of school desegregation are matters to be
resolved through the political process." Id. at 474.
59. Although a 5-4 decision, the split was primarily over whether the state as a whole
could forbid voluntary local busing. The majority held that the state could not so forbid
localities from acting. The dissent was not prepared to hold that busing for purpose of
integration could not be authorized by anybody, although in one footnote, the dissent did
suggest that that was an open question. See id. at 491 n.6 (Powell, J., dissenting). Clearly, the
Court, as an entity, held that voluntary race-based busing, for the purpose of maximizing
integration, was, at least, permissible. See id. at 474.
60. Indeed, Ray might not even be disadvantaged as much as the involuntarily bused
white student. While our hypothetical law school turned him down, he may well be able to
enter a comparable or nearly comparable law school, do extremely well there, and have a
superb career at the bar. We are all familiar with such instances.
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Furthermore, in United States v. Fordice,6' the Court held that
sometimes universities must take account of the racial impact of
admissions standards.62  In Fordice, the Court considered the
propriety of a state university using American College Testing
Program scores ("ACT scores") alone as the basis for admission.63
The Court invalidated this reliance on ACT scores in part because
"the disparity between black and white students' high school grade
averages was much narrower than the gap between their average
ACT scores, thereby suggesting that an admissions formula which
included grades would increase the number of black students eligible
for automatic admission to all of Mississippi's public universities."'
To be sure, Fordice, which involved one time de lure segregation,
and arguably some institutional foot-dragging in its attempt to
eliminate it, does not directly resolve the issue raised in this Essay.
Nevertheless, it is hard to read Fordice without a sense that the Court
would be pleased with an institution that adopted an objectively
neutral admissions policy that maximized integration. Thus, if, for
the purpose of maximizing integration, a state university were to
adopt an objectively neutral admissions criterion such as: "The top
10% of every graduating class in this State shall be admitted," it is
hard to believe that the Court would question it. Indeed, in response
to Hopwood,65 the University of Texas undergraduate schools
adopted just such a rule.66
If such a rule is constitutional even when enacted for the purpose
of maximizing racial diversity, would it not be more sensible to allow
states to obtain the best racially-integrated class by considering all of
the factors that go into making such a class? A black student with a
very low SAT score who finished in the top 10% of a very poor Texas
high school may not be in a position to compete at the University of
Texas. Thus, she may be out of school after a year, doing neither
herself nor the university's diversity any good. On the other hand, a
much more promising black student from a much better high school
may not be included in the mix because there may be no objective
basis other than race for admitting him. Thus, if something similar to
my proposal is not constitutional, universities may be able to
integrate only at the cost of choosing less than the best minority
61. 505 U.S. 717 (1992).
62. See id. at 737-38.
63. See id. at 733-38.
64. Id. at 737.
65. Hopwood v. Texas, 78 F.3d 932 (5th Cir.), cert denied, 518 U.S. 1033 (1996).
66. See TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 51.803 (West 1997).
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student in order to satisfy somebody's idea of objectivity.
Returning to our law school hypothetical for a moment, assume
that the admissions committee, which was prepared to admit Bill
Smith over Ray Brown for the last spot in the class, has received a
last-minute application from Judy Jones. Judy is a white woman who
was raised in an otherwise all-black ghetto. She has a 2.9 average
from Yale67 and a 148 LSAT. Assume that the admissions committee
decides to admit her over both Bill and Ray and makes the following
statement in doing so: "Judy Jones has one of the most unique
backgrounds that we have ever seen at this law school. Her
perspectives are bound to be different from any other student in this
class. Although choosing her over Bill Smith will both lower the class
average and make the class marginally whiter, we believe that the
added diversity of her presence is worth both of these costs.
Consequently, she is admitted as the 200th and last student in this
class."
Assuming that both Ray and Bill file suit challenging the
admissions committee's action, how should the cases be resolved?
Unless Ray can establish both that there is a constitutional right to a
meritocracy and that GPA and LSAT are the sole measure of merit,
it is hard to see how he can win vis-a-vis Judy. They are both white,
and Judy has more to add to diversity. Consequently, Ray's claim is
actually weaker against Judy than it is against Bill. And it is weaker
only because of the respective races of Bill and Judy."8 Bill would
like to claim that Judy can't be chosen over him because that would
be a racial choice, and race can't count. But, if he is correct on that
premise, Ray, and not Bill, should be admitted. Thus, either way, Bill
loses. If race can count, Judy is admitted. If race can't count, Ray is
admitted.
It seems to me that the simple solution to all of this is to say that
race can count when its purpose is to maximize diversity, so long as
67. I have hypothesized the same undergraduate school for all of the applicants to avoid
complicating the problem by speculation as to the relative quality of different undergraduate
institutions.
68. Unless something like my proposal is adopted, a white student such as Ray would be
able to preclude a black student such as Bill from being admitted ahead of him. (Racial
classifications are forbidden absent a compelling interest, and diversity is not a compelling
interest. See supra note 47 and accompanying text.) Perversely, however, he could not
preclude an even less-credentialed white student, Judy, from taking his spot because there
would be no racial classification. (Diversity is rational, which is enough because of the
absence of a racial classification.) Professor Graglia's scheme, for example, would allow Judy
to replace Ray, but would not allow Bill, with higher numbers than Judy, to replace Ray. See
Graglia, supra note 15, at 1522-24.
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there are no hard and fast rules as to which race will be benefited.6 9
That is, so long as diversity always wins, it does not matter which race
loses in the particular situation. Thus, the admissions committee
should be free to choose among Ray, Bill, and Judy." In the absence
of invidious racial discrimination, neither of the losers should be able
to challenge the admissions committee's choice.
But, you might say, however much you argue that this racial
classification need not be analyzed under strict scrutiny, you must
come to grips with Adarand, which held "that all racial classifications,
imposed by whatever federal, state, or local governmental actor, must
be analyzed by a reviewing court under strict scrutiny. '71 The answer
is that this is not a racial classification within the meaning of Adarand.
And how, you ask, can something that makes race relevant not be a
racial classification? The answer comes directly from Adarand itself.
There we are told that the Fourteenth Amendment
protect[s] persons, not groups. It follows from that principle
that all governmental action based on race-a group
classification long recognized as "in most circumstances
irrelevant and therefore prohibited" -should be subjected
to detailed judicial inquiry to ensure that the personal right
to equal protection of the laws has not been infringed.72
The admissions standard proposed in this Essay follows this
proposal to the letter. Each student not presumptively admitted or
rejected on the basis of apparent intellectual acumen is analyzed as
an individual, not as a member of a racial group. In each case, all of
his or her relevant demographic attributes are weighed in accordance
with institutional needs.73 No race has an automatic admit or even a
69. Professor Graglia is quite wrong in suggesting that with "perfect illogic" I argue
that whiteness as an admissions criterion is necessarily discrimination. Graglia, supra note
15, at 1522-23. I contend that neither favoring Bill because of his blackness nor Judy
because of her whiteness is racial discrimination so long as there are no hard and fast rules
as to which race will benefit.
70. The committee could legitimately choose Ray by deciding that his probable
intellectual firepower will give the class what it needs most. Diversity is, after all, a
permissible, not mandatory goal. Furthermore, the committee could decide that the class
is already sufficiently diverse. The fact that some of us would disagree with this choice
does not render it unconstitutional.
The committee could legitimately choose Bill over Ray for the reasons presented
throughout this Essay. It could choose Bill over Judy either because it believed that
Judy's numbers were sufficiently marginal to render her an at-risk student, or because it
believed that the racial diversity added by Bill was more significant than the cultural
diversity added by Judy. Finally, it could choose Judy to further cultural diversity.
71. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200,227 (1995) (emphasis added).
72 Id. (quoting Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81,100 (1943)) (citation omitted).
73. Compare Justice O'Connor's opinion for the Court in Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630
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presumptive leg up. Rather, each person is assessed in accordance
with institutional needs. In the contest between Bill and Ray, Bill
did, to be sure, have an advantage by being black. On the other
hand, in the contest between Judy and Bill, Judy had an advantage by
being white.74
Of course, as the Court has so eloquently said: "Equal
protection of the laws is not achieved through indiscriminate
imposition of inequalities."75  But the admissions criteria do not
impose inequalities. Rather, as previously noted,76 they provide the
most relevant individual bases upon which to determine which
students can do most to improve the quality of education offered at
the institution. This is precisely the kind of individual-as opposed
to group-analysis that Adarand demands.77
CONCLUSION
This essay has supported three propositions. First, from an
educational perspective, diversity in legal education, including (but
not limited to) racial diversity, is a prudent aim for law school
admissions committees to seek. Second, such an admissions policy is
fair to all because it measures merit appropriately; that is, in accord
with institutional needs. And third, such a policy is constitutional.
In regard to constitutionality, I have contended that such an
admissions policy should not be deemed racial discrimination that
must be justified by a compelling governmental interest. My reasons
(1993), where she stated:
Moreover, redistricting differs from other kinds of state decisionmaking in that
the legislature always is aware of race when it draws district lines, just as it is
aware of age, economic status, religious and political persuasion, and a variety of
other demographic factors. That sort of race consciousness does not lead
inevitably to impermissible race discrimination.
Id at 646 (second emphasis added). Surely the race consciousness involved in diversity
admissions is closer to the permissible race consciousness in redistricting than the suspect
race classifications of Adarand.
74. And, as indicated earlier, I would favor the first Iranian or the first Sikh over the
twenty-third African-American. See supra text accompanying note 28.
75. Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 22 (1948).
76. See supra text accompanying notes 32-38.
77. Justice O'Connor underscored the need for such individualized analysis in her
dissent in Metro Broadcasting (vindicated by Adarand), where she approvingly described
Justice Powell's Bakke opinion as follows: "[R]ace-conscious measures might be employed
to further diversity only if race were one of many aspects of background sought and
considered relevant to achieving a diverse student body." Metro Broad., Inc. v. FCC, 497
U.S. 547, 621 (1990) (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (citing Regents of the Univ. v. Bakke, 438
U.S. 265, 314 (1978) (opinion of Powell, J.)), overruled by Adarand Constructors, Inc. v.
Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995).
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are essentially the same as those that justify busing to voluntarily
maximize racial integration. Maximizing diversity in law schools and
integration in public schools are both legitimate government
functions that are in no sense suspect. Strict scrutiny is only required
when the government acts in a suspect manner. Creating diversity in
legal education is not suspect.
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